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ii An Analysis of a United States-Canada-Mexico Free Trade Agreement 
 
 
1.  A Free Trade Agreement in a Broader Context* 
 
The effects of the proposed Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico should be distinguished from the relationships that already 
exist among the three countries and from those events that would occur in absence of the 
FTA.  The countries are already important trading partners, and the larger economic size 
of the U.S. has brought about an asymmetrical relationship.  The U.S. is a much more 
important trading partner for Canada and Mexico than either of those countries is for the 
U.S. 
 
Certain important policy problems will continue to exist with or without a FTA.  
Mexico enters the trade negotiations with a large external debt, a much lower average 
wage and per capita income than its northern neighbors, a higher inflation rate, and a 
depreciating currency.  The U.S. enters negotiations with a persistent trade deficit, 
international debtor status, and traditional manufacturing industries (automobiles, steel, 
textiles, and apparel) that have contracted due to import competition.  U.S. fiscal policy 
has been characterized by chronic deficits.  The unemployment rate has increased as part 
of the recession.  Monetary policy may either be directed toward lower interest rates 
designed to shorten the recession or higher interest rates designed to strengthen the dollar. 
 
It should be noted that certain Mexican products already benefit from the tariff 
preferences in absence of the FTA.  The maquiladoras along the U.S. border are a major 
source of Mexican industrial exports.  Certain products qualify for the General System of 
Preferences and the Caribbean Initiative.  Thus, the initial trade situation in the U.S. 
facing Mexican producers is not one of non-discriminatory tariffs. 
 
It should also be noted that, prior to the trilateral FTA negotiations, Mexico 
carried out substantial unilateral trade liberalization.  Prior to 1983 the Mexican economy 
was subject to direct controls and the industrial sector was heavily protected.  The main 
policy tools were import licenses, official prices, and the exchange rate (Sobarzo).  
Although 37 criteria were relevant to issuing import licenses, in practice the most 
important were (1) whether the imported product was produced in the country, and (2) 
whether domestic production was necessary to satisfy national needs.  By 1982, 100% of 
import categories were subject to import licenses.  Imports were also restricted by the use 
of official prices.  They were the basis of tariff rates, and they were set at levels far above 
comparable world prices.  Finally the use of an overvalued exchange rate made imported 
inputs artificially cheap for Mexican manufacturers. 
 
Unilateral liberalization by Mexico began in 1983.  The number of import 
categories subject to import licenses was reduced and by 1986 only 35% of categories 
were covered.  However, 60% of agricultural products remained covered in 1991.   
 
1 Mexico joined the GATT in 1986, and official prices were gradually eliminated and tariff rates 
fell.  Maximum tariff rates fell from 100% to 20% in 1989, and the trade  weighted average tariff 
fell from 25% in 1985 to 10% in 1989 (Sobarzo, p.16).  Thus, U.S. exporters faced a more open 
Mexican market in 1991 than they did in 1980 even before the FTA negotiations began. 
 
Agreement on a free trade area between the U.S. and Canada has already been reached, 
and implementation of the arrangement began in January 1989.  The existence of the U.S.-
Canada agreement makes the current trilateral negotiations less important for Canada than they 
would have been in absence of the bilateral agreement.  The additional benefits to Canada from 
gaining greater access to the Mexican market are much smaller than the gains already obtained 
from the bilateral U.S.-Canadian agreement. 
 
Indirect Influences on Agricultural Trade 
 
Although this paper is primarily concerned with the effects of the FTA on agricultural 
trade, other aspects of the FTA will influence agricultural products indirectly.  Agricultural 
machinery, pesticides, herbicides, fertilizer, and gasoline are important traded inputs that 
influence costs and the effective rate of protection for agricultural products.  The scope of policy 
reform will influence trade.  A significant issue is whether liberalization includes only tariffs and 
import quotas or whether it also includes production subsidies, price supports, input subsidies, 
parastatals, and other domestic policies that affect trade indirectly.  In the U.S.-Canada 
agreement, only border measures were included. 
 
Agricultural trade will also be influenced by international factor mobility.  There will be 
a stronger incentive to make direct investments in Mexico by Americans and Canadians as well 
as investors from non-member countries.  However, the amount of investment depends on 
relaxing Mexican restrictions on foreign investment.  The Bush administration has stated that 
rules related to migration are not negotiable, but additional job opportunities in Mexico are 
expected to reduce the supply of migrants to the U.S.  However, a reduction in migration may 
make it more difficult for American farmers to hire workers. 
 
The Uruguay Round and Multilateral Trade 
 
To the extent that the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations succeeds in substantially 
lowering tariffs and relaxing import quotas on a most favored nation basis, the FTA and all 
preferential arrangements become less important.  In the extreme case of complete elimination of 
all trade barriers by GATT, free trade agreements would have no effect on trade.  In general, the 
effect of an FTA depends on the difference between a country’s most favored nation tariff 
against non-members and its zero tariff against member countries.  This difference represents the 
margin of discrimination in favor of members.  Since the amount of damage imposed on non-
members by an FTA depends on this margin of discrimination, the existence of FTA negotiations 




2 The outcome of the FTA also depends on whether membership is restricted to the U.S., 
Canada, and Mexico or whether additional countries in the Americas are added.  For example, 
Chile and Costa Rica have already expressed interest in joining the FTA, and Mexico has 
discussed trade arrangements with other Latin American countries.  As the number of 
participating countries gets larger the effects of the FTA approach those of multilateral 




2.  Agricultural Trade Among the United States, Mexico, and Canada 
 
The United States, Mexico and Canada are important trading partners.  U.S.-Mexico 
bilateral agricultural trade increased from $3.5 million higher than in 1980 to a record level of 
$5.1 billion in 1990, about $10 million higher than in 1989 and nearly $1.0 billion higher than in 
1988.  Throughout the decade the value of this trade grew at an average annual rate of 6.5 
percent, one of the highest growth rates among major U.S. agricultural trading partners.  
However, the growth pattern of U.S.-Mexican agricultural exports has differed.  While Mexican 
agricultural exports to the United States showed a steady growth trend (aside from a surge in 
1986 which was mainly the result of higher coffee prices), U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico 
have fluctuated widely, mainly reflecting Mexican harvest and adverse Mexican economic 
conditions. 
 
In 1990, Mexico was the fourth largest single market for U.S. farm exports (after Japan, 
Canada, and Korea, fifth if the EC is included), with total export value of a record $2.55 billion.  
As a source of products, Mexico was our second largest supplier of agricultural products (after 
Canada), with total shipments of a record $2.6 billion in 1990.  Despite a slight agricultural trade 



















3 Agricultural trade with Mexico accounts for less than 2 percent each of Canada’s total 
agricultural exports and imports.  Wheat, canola (rapeseed), and dairy products dominate 
Canada’s agricultural exports to Mexico.  Wheat exports to Mexico are made by the Canadian 
Wheat Board (CWB); sales have also benefited from government-backed credit.  Canola exports 
are done by private government-backed credit and other government export promotion programs.  
Canada’s dairy product exports, mainly nonfat dry milk, result from surplus production 
generated by Canada’s supply management system, and are exported with subsidies financed by 
producer levies.  Fruits and vegetables are Canada’s main agricultural imports from Mexico and 
are subject to substantial tariffs. 
 
The United States has become an increasingly important market for Canada, and takes 
over a third of Canada’s agricultural exports.  As Canada’s crop exports have been buffeted by 
low world prices and bad weather, exports of animal products and other high valued products 
have increased.  Most of these products go to the U.S.: Animal product exports – mainly live 
animals, pork, and beef – account for about 40% of Canada’s exports to the U.S. (Table 1).  For 
example, the value of Canada’s exports fell 15 percent in 1989 as drought reduced export 


















U.S. Mexican Agricultural Trade 
 
U.S. agricultural imports from Mexico rose fairly steadily throughout the 1980’s, starting 
at about $1.1 billion in the early 1980’s reaching a record $2.6 billion in 1990.  U.S. imports of 
horticultural products from Mexico have registered the most rapid increase, rising from $500 
million in the early 1980’s to a record $1.6 billion in 1989. 
 
Mexican exports of horticultural products represent about 60% of total agricultural 
exports to the U.S.  In recent years, Mexico has also become an important U.S. supplier of 
processed foods, including tomato paste and beverages such as fruit juices and beer. 
 
4 The major agricultural imports from Mexico in 1990 were: fresh vegetables ($804 
million), live cattle ($420 million), coffee ($328 million), fresh non-citrus fruits ($121 million), 
















U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico varied fairly dramatically during the 1980’s falling from 
about $2.5 billion in the early 1980’s to $1.0 - $1.2 billion in 1986-87, before rising to a record 
level of $2.7 billion in 1989.  Grains have typically been the largest export items.  Dairy, 
livestock and poultry products have showed the most rapid growth, rising from less than $300 
million in 1980 to about $800 million annually during the 1988-90 period.  U.S. exports of 
horticultural products rose to a record $162 million in 1990 more than triple the amount exported 
in 1987. 
 
The major agricultural exports to Mexico in 1990 were: corn ($400 million), grain sorghum 
($328 million), soybeans and by-products ($265 million), sugar ($118 million), dried beans 
($100 million), seeds ($87 million), beef and veal ($81 million), animal fats and oils ($79 
million), cattle hides ($75 million), dairy products ($62 million), poultry meat ($56 million), live 















5 U.S. Canadian Agricultural Trade 
 
Canada’s agricultural imports grew faster than agricultural exports in the 1980’s, 
resulting in a shrinking trade surplus since 1983 (Tables 2 and 3).  The U.S. is by far Canada’s 
dominant supplier of agricultural imports, although its share of total imports in the 1980’s 
remained constant at between 55-60 percent.  Fruits, vegetables, and related products account for 
about half of Canada’s imports from the U.S.  In the mid-1980’s when Canada’s dollar was weak 
relative to the U.S. dollar, Canadian importers looked to other (non-U.S.) suppliers for 
horticultural products – for example, Chilean grapes and New Zealand apples.  But U.S. fruit and 
vegetable exports to Canada have continued to rise in the 1980’s.  In 1989, the U.S. accounted 
for 91 percent of Canada’s fresh vegetable imports and 74 percent of fresh fruit imports, down 



































 The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA) went into effect on January 1, 1989.  
Tariffs on some agricultural products have come down 30 percent as of January 1, 1991.  Tariffs 
on some agricultural products have already fallen to zero under the accelerated tariff reduction 
provisions.  The tariff snapback provision was used for the first time in May 1990.  Canada 
reduced its on asparagus from 15 to 12 percent for 2 weeks.  Under this provision, for a period of 
20 years, tariffs on fresh fruits and vegetables will be allowed to “snap back” to the previous 
Most Favored Nation level if: 1) for 5 consecutive days the import price is below 90 percent of 
the average monthly import price over the past 5 years, excluding the high and low years; and 2) 
planted acreage in the importing country is not higher than the previous 5-year average, again 
excluding the high and low years. 
 
The grain support calculations under Article 705 resulted in Canada removing its import 
license on oats in 1989, giving U.S. exports free access to Canada.  The calculations for the 
1988/89 and 1989/90 will be announced in May 1991. 
 
 
Canadian-Mexican Agricultural Trade 
 
Two-way trade between Canada and Mexico for all products was only $2 billion in 1989, 
compared with $52 billion for U.S.-Mexican trade.  Canada was a net importer with exports of 
$524 million and imports of $1.4 billion.  About a fourth of Canada’s exports to Mexico in 1989 
were agricultural, but less than 10 percent of Canada’s imports from Mexico were agricultural 
products. 
 
Canadian-Mexican agricultural trade is small compared with U.S.-Canadian agricultural 
trade and variable, reflecting Mexico’s unstable external financial situation.  Canadian 
agricultural exports to Mexico in 1989 were only $127 million and agricultural imports from 
Mexico equaled just $104 million (Tables 4 and 5).  Except for 1986, Canada was a net exporter 
during the 1980’s.  Canada’s main agricultural products are wheat, canola, and dairy products.  
Imports from Mexico are more diverse and include tomatoes, peppers, cucumbers, frozen 




























3.  Barriers to Trade Between Mexico and the United States 
 
Barriers to trade for both Mexico and the United States will be discussed.  Since details 
about U.S. barriers to agricultural trade have appeared in publications of the OECD and the 
Economic Research Service for the USDA, more border measures, such as tariffs and import 
quotas, and non-border policies will be discussed, but only the border measures will be used in 
the simulation of the FTA. 
 
 
Mexican Barriers to Trade 
 
Mexico’s agricultural policies have had two objectives: to boost the incomes of small 
farmers through increased agricultural output and to provide low-cost food to the low-income, 
largely urban, consumers.  The main programs implemented to achieve the first goal have 
included price supports, fiscal support, input subsidies, general marketing subsidies, and control 
of foreign trade to protect domestic output from imports.  The second goal has been pursued 
through price controls, subsidies on basic products, and a government distribution system for 
basic food commodities. 
 
Government intervention in procurement, marketing and consumption has been 
extensive.  Before 1990, the Mexican government intervened in virtually all phases of the 
agricultural sector including: production of grains, food processing, storage, domestic 
purchasing, import purchasing, regulation and price controls, provision of financial services, 
producer subsidies, and food industry subsidies. 
 
Historically, consumer and producer prices for major agricultural products have been 
influenced by government procurement from producers at guarantee prices, export and import 
controls, direct consumer price controls, and direct subsidies to private and parastatal processors.  





 As part of the economic reform process, the government has moved toward more market-
oriented price policies, with less government intervention in the procurement, marketing and 
consumption of food products.  The principal agricultural policy reforms have sought to reduce 
government intervention by replacing producer supports with a new system, known as 
“agreement prices” intended to facilitate gradual movement toward market pricing; eliminating 
price controls for certain products; reducing tariff protection, reducing untargeted domestic 
producer subsidies for inputs (credit, fertilizer, electricity and irrigation water), and increasing 
targeted consumer subsidies. 
 
In addition, in an effort to reduce fiscal transfers, since 1988 the Mexican government has 
been restructuring or privatizing the various parastatals through a process of mergers, liquidation, 
and sales.  More significantly, the recent divestiture program has targeted some of the biggest 
enterprises in the public sector.  In particular, the National Company of Subsistence 
Commodities (CONASUPO) was divested of its vegetable oil-crushing plants, processing 
affiliates and retail operations in urban areas, and most of the parastatals under SARH control, 




Historically, the principal policies affecting Mexican producers of basic agricultural 
commodities have included: (1) a price support program, managed by CONASUPO, 
guaranteeing the purchase of domestic crops at a fixed minimum price which has generally 
exceeded the world market price; (2) input subsidies for credit, insurance, fertilizer, pesticides, 
irrigation water, and electricity; (3) general marketing subsidies provided by CONASUPO; (4) 
fiscal support; (5) direct subsidies on basic agricultural products; (6) import license requirements 
and tariffs; and (7) a misaligned official exchange rate for the peso. 
 
Each of these policies has been provided through specific instruments, and with the 
intervention of several government institutions.  Table 6 presents a description of the principal 
policies affecting Mexican producers of basic agricultural commodities and the main government 
institutions intervening in the provision of these subsidies. 
 
Mexico’s policy intervention in agriculture was estimated in the form of producer subsidy 
equivalents (PSE’s).  PSE’s are defined as the amount required to compensate producers for the 
removal of government intervention. 
 
The PSE’s measured in this section include policies that affect producer prices, 












































The commodities covered in this exercise represent seven major crops (wheat, corn, 
sorghum, dry beans, sesame seed, and cotton), and five major livestock products (beef, pork, 
poultry, eggs and milk).  All these commodities are included in the SWOPSIM estimation.  Other 
commodities included in the SWOPSIM, but not in the PSE’s calculation due to insufficient data 






   The impacts of agricultural policies throughout the 1982-89 period include: 
 
§ During the 1982-89 period, producers of major crops systematically received a higher 
level of subsidies than livestock producers through price supports, low-priced inputs, and 
preferential credits.  Subsidies to crop producers made up 45 percent of the value of crop 
output as measured by the PSE’s for the 1982-89 period.  By comparison, livestock 
producers received lower subsidies during the same period, and, in some years, were taxed 
through relatively low domestic prices. 
 
§ Of the basic commodities, corn, soybeans, sorghum, and dry beans received more support 
than wheat.  Corn and dry beans attracted large subsidies because of its importance to small 
farmers.  Soybeans and sorghum production were heavily subsidized in an import 
substitution effort.  Wheat, produced by large-scale commercial farmers, have traditionally 
received relatively little support. 
 
§ For corn, the average 1982-89 PSE was 55 percent of producer value.  For soybeans, it 
was 48 percent of producer value, for sorghum, 44 percent, and for dry beans, 38 percent.  
For wheat, the average 1982-89 PSE was 26 percent of producer value. 
 
§ For corn, soybeans, and sorghum, price supports and import licensing accounted for the 
bulk of the subsidy.  In the case of dry beans and corn, farm credit subsidies were very 
important to production because ejidatarios (small communal landholders) cannot offer their 
land as collateral for short-term loans from private institutions.  For wheat, the irrigation 
subsidy accounted for most of the support.  Also, the marketing subsidies provided by 
CONASUPO were important to the maintenance of the price support programs and to an 
adequate supply of agricultural products in the principal urban centers. 
 
§ Comparatively, the exported crops (sesame seed and cotton) received less protection than 
the basic commodities.  For sesame seed, the average 1982-89 PSE was 19 percent of 
producer value.  For cotton, it was 15 percent of producer value.  For sesame seed, farm 
credit represented the bulk of the subsidy.  In the case of cotton, the exchange rate adjustment 
and the irrigation subsidy accounted for most of the support. 
 
§ Of the basic livestock products, poultry and pork received more support than beef, eggs, 
and milk. 
 
§ For poultry, the average 1982-89 PSE was 25 percent of producer value, and for pork, 18 
percent.  For eggs, the average 1982-89 PSE was –20 percent of producer value, for beef, -15 
percent, and for milk, -2 percent.  For poultry and pork, price supports and import licensing 
accounted for the bulk of the subsidy.  For beef and eggs, the exchange rate adjustment 
accounted for most of the support.  For milk, the balanced feed subsidies and fiscal transfers 




 § Mexico consistently undervalued its currency during 1982-87, providing an implicit 
subsidy to its producers that averaged approximately 8 percent of the value of crop 
production and livestock products each year. 
 
§ As part of the economic stabilization reforms initiated in 1988, and Mexico’s broad 
program to liberalize its economy, the Government has sharply reduced tariff rates and 
import licensing requirements, and also reduced untargeted subsidies to crops and livestock 
producers (credit, insurance, fertilizer, electricity, irrigation, and balanced feed subsidies). 
 
§ Policies affecting consumers include the same border measures and price supports that 
affect producers, as well as direct consumer subsidies. 
 
§ During the 1982-89 period, direct CONASUPO’s subsidies to the food industry were 
highly concentrated in wheat milling (19 percent of consumer value), corn processing (14 
percent of consumer value), and dry beans (8 percent of consumer value).  For the soybean 
oil crushing plants, the average CSE was 9 percent of consumer value, and for sorghum, less 
than 1 percent.  In the case of corn, CONASUPO’s consumer subsidies to low-income 
consumers averaged 6 percent of the value to consumers during the 1982-89 period. 
 
§ CONASUPO’s consumer subsidies to millers and low-income consumers have declined 
substantially since 1987.  Subsidies to the oilseeds and sorghum industries were eliminated in 
1985.  Since 1987, consumers of wheat, corn, sorghum, soybeans, pork and poultry have 
been taxed through the effect of border controls increasing the price wedge between domestic 
and international prices, while consumers of dry beans, beef and milk have received 
subsidies, quite substantial as in the case of milk. 
 
Table 7 (and Figure 4-A & 4-B) presents the individual commodity PSE’s expressed as a 
percentage of the value of production.  PSE’s can be positive (indicating a subsidy) or negative 
(indicating a tax), depending on government policy objectives (Figure 5-A & 5-B).  Tables 8 and 
9 present the total estimated subsidies for the crop and livestock sectors by type of policy, 
expressed in millions of dollars.  The base year for exchange rate adjustment is 1977. 
 
 
Price Policy and Border Controls 
 
From the early 1950’s until 1989, the Agricultural Cabinet
1 set uniform nationwide 
support (guaranteed) prices for all major crops (corn, dry beans, wheat, rice, soybeans, copra, 
malting barley, sorghum, sesame, sunflower, cottonseed, and safflower).  The guaranteed price 
was supported by CONASUPO through farmgate purchases of major crops. 
 
 
                                                 
1 The Agricultural Cabinet is a committee presided by the President, with members from the Ministry of Agriculture 
(SARH), Commerce (SECOFI), Finance (SHCP), Planning and Budgeting Office (SPP), Agrarian Reform (SRA), 







































































































































1Includes wheat, corn, sorghum, soybeans, dry beans, sesame seed, and cotton. 
 
 



















































 In 1989, the government eliminated the price guarantee program for all primary commodities 
except corn and dry beans.  Given the economic and social importance of these commodities, the 
GOM determined that they should continue to have a guaranteed price. 
 
Basic crops other than corn and dry beans are now subject to a new system known as 
“agreement prices.”  This new system intended to facilitate gradual movement toward market 
pricing, is based on a compromise between the government, producers, distributors and 
processors (consumers).  Under this scheme, CONASUPO is no longer obligated to buy all 
domestic production, but private traders are required to purchase the entire domestic crop at the 
agreement price before any import takes place.  Currently, wheat, soybeans, sorghum, barley, 
oats, and rice are under the agreement pricing system.  The agreement price is set on the basis of 
the international price (Chicago Board of Trade spot price for grains and oilseeds) and the 
marketing costs established by the Mexican Government.  These costs differ across products, but 


















Figure 6 depicts the logic of a government price support.  S is the supply curve reflecting 
increasing costs faced by producers rising production in the short-run.  D, the demand for 
agricultural output.  With no government intervention and no imports QM and PM are the market 
quantity and price respectively.  Under the assumption of a one-period situation in which all 
government purchases have to be sold during the same period, in order to increase output to Q1, 
the government has to buy the crop at the support price P1, and sell it at price P0, at a unit subsidy 
of P0P1.  The total government cost of the price subsidy is P0P1AB.  A further increase in the 
price support to P2 will raise the government cost of the price subsidy to P3P2EF. 
 
Figure 7 illustrates how the contribution of Mexico’s import licensing requirement would 
be estimated in a PSE.  The world price PW1 is below the intersection of domestic supply S and 
demand D, so that imports will be M1, in a free market where the world price prevails.  Mexico’s 
 
 
17 import licensing requirement is in effect a quota, making Mexico’s excess demand curve ED2 




















The government has long employed input subsidies to stimulate agricultural production, 
principally, credit, crop insurance, fertilizer, pesticides, improved seeds, irrigation water, 
electricity, and fuel.  As part of the agricultural policy reform the government has been reducing 
untargeted subsidies for producers.  Based on PSE’s estimations, input subsidies averaged 23 
percent of the value of livestock products each year during 1982-89.  Input subsidies represented 
over one-third of the gross value of production for basic crops in 1982 had come to represent 
only 17 percent of the value of crop production by 1989. 
 
Credit.  Historically, the bulk of the financing to the agricultural sector (about 94 percent) 
has been channeled through BANRURAL, FIRA (agricultural trust fund in Bank of Mexico), 
and the Commercial Banks, which would provide working capital loans of up to one year.  
Medium-term credit was provided by FICART (agricultural trust fund in the Finance Ministry, 
SHCP). 
 
Financial institutions channeled their loans to producers of different types: low, middle 
and high-income producers.  Interest rates on loans to farmers were set below commercial 
lending rates and varied according to income, type of producer and product.  Most of the 
portfolio of BANRURAL and FICART was lent to low-income producers, while FIRA’s 
portfolio was divided between middle and high income producers.  Commercial banks distribute 





 During the 1982-89 period, credit subsidies channeled through these institutions 
represented 11 percent of the value of crop production, and less than 1 percent of the value of 
livestock production.  During this period, over one-half of the credit subsidy went to corn 
production, and the rest to dry beans (17%), sorghum (16%), wheat (10%), soybeans (4%), 
cotton (2%) and sesameseed (1%). 
 
As part of the economic reform program, credit subsidies have been reduced and 
BANRURAL, FIRA, FICART are being restructured.  All interest rate controls were removed 
April 1989 and it was established that BANRURAL could no longer serve high income farmers 
or sustain insolvent producers, financing only “low-income farmers with high economic 
potential.”  BANRURAL, FIRA and FEGA now provide subsidized credit only to ejidatarios 
and small farmers, while commercial farmers previously serviced by BANRURAL are serviced 
by commercial banks.  FIRA and BANCOMEXT also can provide dollar credits under 
competitive conditions to export agriculture. 
 
Crop Insurance.  Until 1990, all BANRURAL borrowers were obliged to get crop and 
livestock insurance through ANAGSA the government insurance company.  ANAGSA was 
disincorporated in February 1990 and replaced by AGROASEMEX, a mixed (public and private 
sector) insurance firm to insure crops of only viable farmers on the basis of productivity and low 
risk.  Insurance is now voluntary and based on non-subsidized premiums. 
 
During the 1982-89 period insurance subsidies through ANAGSA had represented a little 
over 3 percent of the gross value of production in the crop sector.  In 1989, the last year of 
operation, the insurance subsidy was distributed among corn (50%), dry beans (17%), sorghum 
(16%), wheat (10%), soybeans (4%), cotton (2%), and sesameseed (1%). 
 
Fertilizer.  The government has controlled production, imports, distribution and exports 
of agrochemicals, and provided fertilizer at subsidized prices through FERTIMEX.  Fertilizer 
subsidies represented about 4 percent of the value of crop production during 1982-89.  Domestic 
prices of fertilizers were increased in the past two years aligning them with international prices.  
FERTIMEX has been disincorporated. 
 
Seeds.  PRONASE, a parastatal under the Ministry of Agriculture (SARH) control, 
regulates the seed market, and provides certified seeds at subsidized prices.  This enterprise is 
being restructured to provide certified seeds at market prices. 
 
Irrigation.  Subsidies for irrigation originate in subsidies on water provided through 
surface irrigation systems, and electricity subsidies for pumping ground water.  The surface 
water subsidy is represented by the operational deficit of the irrigation districts, while the 
electricity subsidy is represented by a below-cost rate for electricity used for pumping of water, 
by the Federal Electricity Commission.  Irrigation subsidies during the 1982-89 period were 
high, particularly for wheat and soybeans.  Throughout the 1982-89 period, irrigation subsidies 
represented over 5 percent of the gross value of crop production. 
 
 
19 Feed.  For the livestock sector, the basic input subsidy was given through balanced feed 
sold to producers at lower than market rates through the government’s balanced feed company, 
ALBAMEX.  During the 1982-89 period, the balanced feed subsidies were distributed among 
milk production (30%), egg production (26%), pork (18%), poultry (16%), and beef (10%).  
ALBAMEX was sold to the private sector in March 1991. 
 
Figure 8 shows the government cost of the inputs subsidies.  D is the demand curve for 
inputs, and S the supply of inputs, which is assumed to be perfectly elastic at PW, the world price 
of inputs.  The per unit subsidy PWPS, encourages additional demand for inputs to I1, from the 
free market level of I0.  The government cost of the input subsidy is PSPWDC.  An increase in the 























In addition to procurement of domestic production and imports CONASUPO also 
participates through its affiliates, in the wholesaling (IMPECSA), retailing (DICCONSA), and 
warehousing (ANDSA, BORUCONSA) of commodities.  CONASUPO has been the monopoly 
importer of grains, oilseeds, and powdered milk, for sale at processing by its affiliates. 
 
In 1989, CONASUPO eliminated the marketing support for all primary agricultural 
commodities, except corn and dry beans, but has not yet modified its role in the wholesale food 
distribution network (IMPECSA) and the several nationwide chains of retail grocery stores 
(DICCONSA).  IMPECSA provides wholesale services to small, private food retailers.  
DICCONSA’s retail outlets included rural stores with targeted consumers, and urban 
supermarkets, both concessioned and directly managed for untargeted consumers. 
 
20 CONASUPO has introduced changes in its warehousing system (ANDSA and 
BORUCONSA) which together own over 56% of Mexico’s 26.5 million tons of basic food 
storage capacity.  These two organizations played distinct but complementary roles: while 
ANDSA operated silos, warehouses, and cold storage facilities in urban areas, BORUCONSA 
was the only storage facility, for basic crops grown in more remote rural areas.  ANDSA also 
provided financial services, and inputs.  The primary objective of BORUCONSA was to assist 
small and medium-scale farmers, primarily corn and dry beans producers, with acquisition, 
storage, and transportation of their harvest.  As part of the reform program, ANDSA will 
modernize its infrastructure and link it to the transport and port infrastructure.  BORUCONSA is 
to expand its geographic coverage, offer its warehouse capacity not only to CONASUPO but 
also to organizations of producers, distribute fertilizers and pesticides, and operate procurement 
centers in remote areas.  Both warehousing facilities are to provide services for private traders at 
commercial rates. 
 
A new organization, Support and Services to Agricultural Marketing (ASERCA), was 
created in April 1991 to facilitate the phase out of CONASUPO’s intervention in the marketing 
of grain and oilseeds, except corn, rice and dry beans.  ASERCA will administer a system of 
deficiency payments for producers to guarantee post harvest financing, administer production 
subsidies, and ensure an adequate supply of commodities in the domestic market.  The Ministry 
of Commerce (SECOFI) will act as mediator between producers and buyers, while the Foreign 
Trade Bank (BANCOMEXT) will finance exports of products. 
 
For 1991, ASERCA has stipulated marketing programs for wheat, sorghum, and 
soybeans.  Under this program registered producers can turn over their grain to the storage 
facility and, in turn, be paid a previously agreed upon price.  The buyer of the grain will receive a 
certificate of deposit guaranteeing payment.  Designated banks will give the buyer an amount 
equivalent to the difference of his payment to the producer and the real cost of the commodity, 
while the remainder of the buyer’s payment is to have a 6-month financing term.  The money to 





CONASUPO has participated in the processing of commodities through its industrial 
food processors affiliates, ICONSA (CONASUPO Grain and Oilseeds Industries), LICONSA 
(CONASUPO Industrialized Milk), MICONSA (CONASUPO Industrialized Maize), and 
TRICONSA (CONASUPO Industrialized Wheat), and administered targeted subsidy programs 
for the low income population. 
 
Food Grains.  CONASUPO provided direct consumer subsidies on wheat flour and wheat 
bread (bolillos).  CONASUPO sells domestic and imported wheat to millers at a price below its 
purchase price, and ensures low consumer prices through direct sales of bread and flour at fixed 
prices in its wholesale and retail outlets. 
 
 
21 For corn, CONASUPO also sells corn to mills at subsidized prices, and directly 
subsidizes the price of processed goods (yellow tortillas, flour, and dough) for low-income 
consumers. 
 
CONASUPO purchased beans directly from producers at a guaranteed price or imported 
directly at the world price.  Beans were then sold to consumers at controlled prices.  All 
marketing costs (distribution and storage) were absorbed by CONASUPO. Consumer prices 
were controlled mostly in urban markets, but rural consumers benefited through direct bulk sales. 
 
Feed.  Users of soybean meal and sorghum have also received a price subsidy 
administered by CONASUPO.  Domestic and imported soybeans are purchased at guaranteed or 
world prices and sold to processors at a lower price, with CONASUPO absorbing all marketing 
costs.  This policy has supported producers of livestock products (e.g. eggs, beef, chicken, pork 
and milk) who faced controlled prices for their products. 
 
Food.  Coupons, representing a target subsidy for specific consumers, were introduced in 
1987.  The current policy objective is to increase the use of subsidies targeted at specific 
consumers (targeted consumers are identified as those earning less than twice the minimum 
salary). 
 
Since mid-1989 CONASUPO has been selling its processing facilities, selling the 3 
commercial plants of LICONSA and the milk production and distribution affiliate of 
CONASUPO.  However, divestiture of these plants has run into problems because of the lack of 
regulation. 
 
ICONSA, a diversified food processing industry whose principal activity was to crush, 
refine, and package vegetable oils and lard, byproducts (animal feed, soaps, detergents), as well 
as corn flour, wheat flour and pastas has been disincorporated. 
 
MICONSA the maize processing industry for tortilla production is still an affiliate of 
CONASUPO.  MICONSA has traditionally received CONASUPO’s subsidies both via price 
differentials and post-production reimbursement. 
 
TRICONSA, CONASUPO’s bread company which provided various wheat products for 
low-income consumers, was liquidated in early 1987. 
 
CONASUPO still has three targeted subsidies programs: tortibonos (tortivales) program 
providing each household with tortilla stamps to obtain 1 kilo of free tortillas per day, the 







22 Table 10 presents Mexico’s internal agricultural support programs in procurement, 



















United States Barriers to Trade 
 
Tariffs and import quotas are not the main focus of protection provided for most 
American farmers.  The main forms are deficiency payments and other production subsidies that 
do not restrict imports directly.  For example, producer subsidy equivalents for wheat are shown 
in Table 11 for 1982-89.  A large number of programs subsidize producers, but in recent years 
35% of producer subsidies came from deficiency payments. 
 
Border measures are more important for dairy products, beef and sugar.  Producer 
subsidy equivalents for sugar are shown in Table 12, and tariffs and quotas comprised 74% of 
total PSEs for the period 1986-88.  However, liberalizing these border measures are not expected 
to increase Mexican exports of these products.  The U.S. currently exports beef and dairy 
products to Mexico. 
 
U.S. border measures that are more significant for Mexican trade are those on fruits and 
vegetables.  The most important products in terms of value of trade in 1988 were tomatoes, 
onions, bell peppers, chili peppers and cucumbers.  Tariffs are mainly expressed as cents per 
kilogram, so the ad valorem equivalent of the specific tariffs varies with the product price.  A 
distinctive feature for some products is a tariff that varies with the season of the year to give 
greater protection when Americans are marketing their products.  The ad valorem equivalent 
tariffs in 1988 were: tomatoes 7-11% (seasonal), onions 9%, chili peppers 10%, bell peppers 
14%, cucumbers 9-38% (seasonal).  In addition to tariffs, many fruits and vegetables are subject 































































































25 Marketing Orders 
 
A marketing order is a legally binding set of requirements imposed on certain producers 
of certain products, usually fruits, vegetables and specialty crops.  Among the stated goals of 
orders are “orderly marketing,” enhancing producer prices relative to their parity levels, and 
protecting consumer interests (Polopolus, et al. p. 12).  The orders can affect international trade, 
because section 8e of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 allows certain 
provisions of marketing orders to be applied to imports as well as to domestic products. 
 
Marketing orders contain a variety of features which can be divided into three groups: (1) 
promotion, research, and packaging, (2) restrictions on grades and sizes, and (3) volume controls.  
(See Table 13.)  Promotion is intended to increase product demand.  Volume controls can be 
used to alter the mean or variance of prices.  They may also be used to carry out price 
discrimination.  Restrictions on sales of fresh products in the domestic market may divert sales 
into foreign markets or into processing (Gardner pp. 220-221, Helmberger pp. 152-53).  
Restrictions on grade and size are the most common features, they are included in nearly all 
marketing orders. 
 
Proponents claim that grade and size restrictions enhance the average quality of products 
and protect the “integrity of the product.”  They also claim that the compulsory nature of orders 
is necessary, because the free rider problem would prevent individual sellers from voluntarily 
refraining from marketing low quality products. 
 
The legal authority for marketing orders comes from the 1937 Agricultural Marketing 
Agreement Act plus numerous amendments.  There are some state marketing orders in additions 
to federal ones.  New marketing orders and amendments to old ones must be approved by vote of 
domestic producers.  Administrative committees make annual reports to the Secretary of 
Agriculture, and amendments to orders must be approved by the Secretary.  Amendments are 
usually initiated by domestic producer groups who have complained about excessive delays 
between their proposals and decisions by the Secretary (Polopolus et al.).  Conversely, exporters 
to the U.S. have complained that some decisions have been without public hearings and without 
sufficient time to allow foreign growers to respond to new features of amended orders (Bredahl 
et al.).  Thus, even if marketing orders continue to be applied to imports into the United States, 
Mexican growers have an interest in procedural safeguards that would restrict their use as 
barriers to imports. 
 
A number of fruits, vegetables, and specialty crops are covered by marketing orders, and 
some new ones have proposed (see Table 13 and USITC).  The most important product in terms 
of value of imports is fresh tomatoes.  Mexican tomatoes compete directly with Florida tomatoes 
during the December to April marketing season.  In 1990, Florida tomatoes comprised 53.3% of 
the U.S. market, and Mexican tomatoes were 43.9% of the market (Messina and Clouser, p13).  
Previous political and legal skirmishes between Florida growers and an alliance of Mexican 













































































































































 Critics of marketing orders have pointed out that it is possible to use grade and size 
restrictions to reduce total supply in the domestic market and raise domestic prices.  It is also 
possible to use marketing orders to harm consumers and processors by lowering the average 
quality of products as viewed by buyers.  Quality has many dimensions, including size and taste, 
that could be represented by a hedonic index.  Consumers would be willing to pay more for 
larger tomatoes, holding constant taste and other characteristics, but they would be willing to 
accept smaller tomatoes for a sufficient improvement in taste.  Suppose the average imported 
tomato was smaller but tastier than the average domestic tomato.  A marketing order based on 
size could decrease a typical consumer’s net valuation of tomatoes by adding $.01 due to greater 
size but subtracting $.02 due to decline in taste.  For example, in the case of one tomato 
marketing order minimum sizes for vine-ripe tomatoes (produced primarily in Mexico) and 
mature green tomatoes (produced primarily in Florida) were chosen in a way that “would have 
significantly reduced Mexican exports of tomatoes to the United States (Bredahl et al).  In 
addition, American buyers did not consider the larger average size of tomatoes to be sufficient 
compensation for the loss in other characteristics.  The adverse effect on net quality of restricting 
imports size was expressed in a Consumer Reports editorial entitled, “Why Tomatoes This 
Winter May be Tough, Tasteless and Costly.” (Bredahl, et al, p.6)  Another example illustrating 
the multiple dimensions of quality is the case of imported filberts (hazelnuts).  U.S. buyers of 
filberts for making candy and confections favored a lower standard for imported nuts (percentage 
of defective nuts) than for domestic filberts because they preferred the higher oil content of 
imports (Polopolus et al. p.38).  Thus, it is possible for total quality to increase in spite of an 
increase in percentage of defective products.  Focusing on a single dimension of quality can be 
misleading. 
 
Although it is possible to use marketing orders to restrict imports, there are some 
economic forces that would reduce their effectiveness as trade barriers.  Marketing orders apply 
only to imports of fresh products, and imported processed products may be imperfect substitutes 
for fresh products.  Thus, imports of tomato sauce and tomato paste from Mexico would be 
expected to reduce any effects of marketing orders on fresh tomatoes.  Secondly, large and small 
products may be good substitutes in the eyes of consumers.  U.S. marketing orders may increase 
the average size of imported tomatoes without necessarily changing total tomato imports.  Some 
of the large Mexican tomatoes that would have been consumed in Mexico in absence of an order 
would instead by shipped to the U.S.  Conversely, some small Mexican or U.S. grown tomatoes 
that would have been consumed in the U.S. in absence of a marketing order would instead be 
consumed in Mexico.  This offsetting effect depends on the U.S. marketing order not being 
applicable in Mexico. 
 
Empirical evidence on the restrictive effect of U.S. marketing orders on imports is rather 
sparse.  The USITC study concludes that removal of tariffs and marketing orders would result in 
a significant increase in U.S. imports from Mexico, especially winter vegetables that are 
manually harvested (USITC p.4-3). However, they do not separate the effects of tariffs and 




30 marketing orders discriminated against imports.  They also claim the gain to consumers from 
larger tomatoes was dominated by the loss of other desirable characteristics brought about by the 
marketing order.  However, they did not provide a quantitative measure of the restrictive effect 
of the order on imports. 
 
More general studies of the effect of marketing orders on domestic prices seem to show 
mixed results.  Studies of the California-Arizona naval orange marketing order indicate price 
discrimination as a result of shifting sales to processing and the foreign market, where demand is 
more elastic (Helmberger pp.152-53).  The result is a gain to U.S. producers, a loss to U.S. 
consumer, and a deadweight loss.  However, a study by Jesse and Johnson compared prices of 
products not covered.  They concluded that products covered by marketing orders did not have 
prices that were systematically higher and less variable than products that were not covered 
(Jesse and Johnson, p.45).  That leaves unanswered the question of what is the purpose of the 
orders and “why are growers generally supportive of these programs which do not appear to have 
achieved a major objective of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act?” (Jesse and Johnson, 
p.45).  Thus, it is possible to devise marketing orders that would restrict trade, but empirical 
evidence demonstrating that real world marketing orders operate this may remains weak. 
 
 
4.  Aggregate Models of a Free Trade Agreement 
 
Several macroeconomic models have been used to analyze the likely effect of the 
proposed free trade agreement involving the United States, Canada and Mexico.  The basic goal 
of all models is the same, namely to show the effect of a free trade agreement (FTA) on real 
income, trade, and related variables for the three countries.  Therefore, it is instructive to 
compare the results of alternative models.  However, before comparing results, some difference 
among models should be recognized. 
 
The models to be considered are by (1) Brown, Dearforff, and Stern, (2) Almon for the 
Department of Labor, (3) Peat Marwick, (4) Harris and Cox, (5) U.S. International Trade 
Commission (USITC), (6) Sobarzo, and (7) Hinojosa-Ojeda and Robinson.  The models differ in 
terms of the amount of detail devoted to each country.  Only the Brown-Deardorff-Stern paper 
treats the U.S., Canada and Mexico in detail.  The Almon, Peat Marwick, and Hinojosa-Ojeda 
and Robinson studies treat the U.S. and Mexico explicitly.  The Harris paper deals with Canada 
only, Sobarzo with Mexico only, and the USITC with the U.S. only. 
 
The models differ in several ways in addition to country coverage.  There are differences 
in model structure as well as parameter values used.  Base years differ in some cases.  The level 
of aggregation varies including aggregation of (and definition of) the agricultural sector.  
Assumptions concerning macroeconomic and exchange rate policy vary.  Assumptions about 
changes in total employment and real wages differ in some cases.  Perhaps the most important 




31 liberalization that occurs.  There is not much disagreement about tariff rates in a particular year, 
but non-tariff barriers were treated in variety of ways, and non-budget measures were rarely 
treated.  A final difference is the treatment of capital flows into Mexico induced by trade 
liberalization. 
 
In spite of the differences, all the studies except the USITC paper provide explicit 
measures of the changes in real income and total trade.  Changes are generally expressed as 
changes in gross domestic product per capita or equivalent variation i.e., the change in income 
valued at base period prices that yields the same change welfare as the given tariff change.  The 
published version of the USITC study expresses change in economic variables as “significant”, 
“moderate”, or “negligible” rather than quantitatively. 
 
A near unanimous result of the studies is that the real incomes of all participating 
countries would rise.  The only exception is the Almon model that shows a slight decrease (-
.04%) in Mexican real income.  In the Hinojosa-Ojeda and Robinson model the gain to the U.S. 
is at most 0.1% of the GDP.  When the rest of the world is treated explicitly, the gains to member 
countries exceed the losses of non-members, i.e. the world benefits from preferential trade.  The 
magnitude  of the income gains varies from .04% to 4.6%.  The changes are expressed as what 
the values would be in the presence of trade liberalization relative to what they actually were in 
the base period.  They should be interpreted as once-for-all gains rather than gains per year. 
 
Different combinations of preferential arrangements have been analyzed by different 
models.  The base situation is non-discriminatory tariffs all other countries.  One case is bilateral 
free trade between the U.S. and Canada.  A second case is the proposed U.S.-Canada-Mexico 
free trade agreement.  A third is bilateral free trade between the U.S. and Mexico.  A fourth is 
two separate bilateral agreements between the U.S. and Canada and between the U.S. and 
Mexico.  In this case Canada and Mexico do not eliminate tariffs against each other.  This 
arrangement has been described as a hub-and-spoke system by Wonnacott.  A practical question 
for Canada is whether they should participate in the trilateral agreement given that a bilateral 
agreement already exists with the U.S.  Two models address this question and they reach the 
same general conclusions.  Canada would be slightly better off with a trilateral agreement than 
with a hub-and-spoke system, but the difference is small.  In terms of the Cox-Harris model, 
Canada’s real income would be .12% higher with the NAFTA than with U.S.-Canada free trade.  
Brown-Deardorff-Stern reach the same conclusion.  The highest real income for Canada occurs 
with the U.S.-Canada free trade.  Adding Mexico, lowers Canada’s income by $52 million, but a 
hub-and-spoke system lowers Canada’s income by $77 million.  Canada is affected much more 
by its trade relationship with the U.S. than it is with its direct trade relationship with Mexico or 
the indirect effect on Canada of U.S.-Mexican trade. 
 
There are major disagreements among the macro models on the effect of the free trade 
agreement on U.S. agriculture.  Almon’s paper shows agriculture being one of the biggest 




32 Stern paper and the Peat Marwick study show a contraction of U.S. agriculture as a result of 
liberalization. 
 
The Peat-Marwick paper divides agriculture into four sectors: animal products, field 
crops, fruits and vegetables, and other agriculture.  According to the model, the FTA causes 
output and employment to fall in all the agricultural sectors, except animal products, which are 
not affected.  Among the 22 sectors fruits and vegetables and field crops are among the ten 
largest losers in terms of value of output.  Although the paper describes the free trade agreement 
as eliminating all tariffs and the tariff equivalent of quotas, the authors warn (p.5) that they may 
have underestimated the stimulus to the U.S. field crops sector. 
 
The Brown-Deardorff-Stern model also predicts that the FTA will cause U.S. agriculture 
to contract.  Agriculture is treated as a single aggregate using 3 digit ISIC categories.  For U.S. 
agriculture, the model predicts an increase in imports and a decrease in exports, production and 
employment.  In Canadian agriculture, the opposite results are predicted for Mexican agriculture. 
 
The Almon study concludes that the FTA will stimulate U.S. agriculture.  Two cases are 
considered: (1) elimination of tariffs only and (2) tariffs plus certain non-tariff barriers.  
Elimination of non-tariff barriers for agriculture is represented by an assumed increase of U.S. 
exports to Mexico of 10-20% per year from the 1989 base period.  When both tariffs and these 
non-tariff barriers are eliminated, U.S. agriculture shows one of the largest sectoral gains in 
exports and employment.  Conversely, when only tariffs are eliminated, agriculture does not 
appear as one of the most expansionary sectors.  Thus, the main stimulus to U.S. agriculture 
appears to be attributable to the reduction in non-tariff barriers. 
 
The USITC study considered the effects of the FTA on the major sectors of U.S. 
agriculture, although it does not provide quantitative estimates.  The first result is a significant 
increase in U.S. horticultural imports from Mexico, assuming the elimination of U.S. marketing 
orders and that Mexican goods satisfy U.S. phytosanitary standards.  Horticultural products 
include both fresh and processed products, and the Mexican processing sector has received 
considerable U.S. direct investment in recent years. 
 
The USITC study also expects a significant increase in U.S. exports of grains and 
oilseeds to Mexico.  In the livestock sector the study predicts a moderate increase in U.S. imports 
of feeder cattle and a moderate increase in U.S. exports of meat to Mexico.  In absence of 
quantitative estimates, it is not possible to compute the net effects of U.S. agricultural trade.  
However, since the USITC’s grains and oilseeds category overlaps considerably with the field 
crops category used in the Peat Marwick paper, there is a conflict in results.  The USITC expects 
the grains and oilseeds sector in the U.S. to expand as a result of the FTA, whereas the Peat 
Marwick paper expects it to contract. 
 
Hinojosa-Ojeda and Robinson treat agriculture as one of the seven sectors in a general 
equilibrium model with three countries: the U.S., Mexico, and the rest of the world. Two of their 
 
 
33 experiments are removing all bilateral tariffs and removing both tariffs and quotas.  U.S. GDP 
rises by 0-12% in response to tariff removal and it remains approximately constant when both 
tariffs and quotas are removed.  In Mexico, real GDP rises by 0.1% with tariff removal and 0.3% 
when both tariffs and quotas are removed.  In agricultural sector, total output in the U.S. is 
constant when tariffs are removed and falls by 0.1% when tariffs are removed and rises by 0.2% 
when both tariffs and quotas are removed. 
 
In the base year of 1988 the U.S. had a bilateral agricultural trade deficit with Mexico of 
$417 million.  According to the model, U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico would increase by a 
greater percentage than U.S. agricultural imports from Mexico both with tariff removal and tariff 
plus quota removal.  Quota removal is a greater stimulus to trade than tariff removal for both 
exports and imports. 
 
Other conceptual experiments are also performed including increasing Mexico’s capital 
stock by 7.5%.  This last experiment has a greater economic effect on both Mexico and the 
United States than trade liberalization.  In this case, U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico increase 
by 39.2% compared to 19.0% with the removal of tariffs and quotas. 
 
The FTA may induce an increase in capital flows into Mexico, but these flows are not 
treated in a uniform way by the various authors.  The magnitudes are potentially important, and 
they depend on relaxation of foreign investment rules by Mexico.  The Peat Marwick paper treats 
capital stock necessary to keep the rate of return on capital equal to its pre-FTA level.  As a 
result, Mexican income increases by 4.64% compared with .32% when the Mexican capital stock 
is held constant. 
 
An advantage of embedding agriculture in an aggregate model is that interactions among 
broad sectors can be shown explicitly.  A disadvantage is the loss of detail about individual 
products and product-specific policies.  A more detailed model might also help to resolve some 




5.  Simulating the Effects of a Free Trade Agreement 
 
Model and Scenarios 
 
The Static World Policy Simulation (SWOPSIM) framework is used to analyze impacts 
of a free trade agreement (FTA) between the United States and Mexico.
4 The model consists of 3 
countries (U.S., Mexico, and Rest-of-World) and 29 agricultural commodities.  We assume that 
 
 
                                                 
4 Canada is omitted from this analysis for two reasons.  First, an additional country greatly increases the size of a 
SWOPSIM – Armington model, and second, Canada’s impact upon the results for the United States and Mexico are 
expected to be quite small. 
 
34 commodities are imperfect substitutes and that consumers discriminate among commodities on 
the basis of their geographical origin, i.e., the Armington hypothesis.  Commodities in the model 
include 9 livestock products, 9 grains and oilseeds, 6 horticultural crops, and 5 other crops.  For a 
detailed description of the model structure and base data set, see Liapis, Krissoff and Neff.  A 
more complete discussion of the results, including more commodity discussion, is presented in 
Krissoff, Neff, and Sharples. 
 
The model contains supply and demand equations for each commodity in each country.  
These equations are set to reproduce prices and quantities produced, consumed, and traded in 
1988.  We assume that world agricultural markets are in intermediate-run equilibrium under 
1988 conditions.  “Intermediate-run” means that the supply and demand elasticities in the model 
represent about a 3- to 5-year period of adjustment to changes in policies and prices. 
 
There are at least four ways that this partial equilibrium analysis may differ from the 
general equilibrium modeling discussed in the previous section.  First, income growth generated 
by an FTA is not endogenously modeled.  Second, nominal exchange rates are assumed to be 
fixed so that changes in the (agricultural) balance of trade can occur.  Third, factor markets are 
not explicitly modeled.  Fourth, considerable detail is allocated to individual agricultural markets 
but there is no examination of nonagricultural markets. 
 
Domestic and border policies that existed in 1988 are put into the model as price wedges.  
They represent differentials among the various observed price signals for a given commodity.  
Each of the 3 scenarios examined in this study is obtained by removing selected policies and 
their associated price wedges, and obtaining a new equilibrium solution.  For further explanation 
of price wedges in the SWOPSIM model, see Roningen, Sullivan and Dixit. 
 
An average of the model’s border price wedges (import tariff equivalent) for the four 
commodity groups are shown below.  The numbers express in percent the price wedge 
equivalent of border measures divided by the traded price.  They do not include direct and 
indirect producer and consumer subsidies.  (Each import tariff equivalent for the commodity 
group is trade-weighted.) 
 
 
  United States  Mexico 
  -----percent----- 
Grains/Oilseeds  0  32 
Livestock/meats/dairy  2  13 
Horticulture  23  14 
Other  1  8 






35 Mexican price wedges are greater than U.S. wedges except in horticultural products.  
This suggests that a bilateral liberalization will tend to move the U.S. agricultural trade balance 




The FTA is analyzed under several alternative sets of conditions.  In particular, we use 
the 3-country model to analyze 3 scenarios.  The first scenario assumes that an FTA between the 
United States and Mexico is put in place under levels of protection and world market conditions 
that existed in 1988.  To obtain this solution, the 1988 base model is modified by removing two-
way border protection between the United States and Mexico. 
 
The second scenario assumes that Mexico unilaterally removes all border protection with 
all countries.  This solution is obtained by removing Mexico’s border protection but making no 
changes for the other two countries.  This scenario represents the extreme of the policy direction 
taking place in Mexico since the late 1980s.  It gives an indication of the impacts on world 
agriculture of Mexican trade liberalization without a U.S.-Mexico FTA. 
 
The third scenario combines the first two – Mexico is assumed to unilaterally remove all 
border protection with all countries and it also is assumed to enter into a free trade agreement 
with the United States.  It is obtained by removing Mexico’s border protection for the other two 
countries and also removing U.S. border protection for Mexican imports.  Border protection 
remains for all imports into Rest-of-World and for U.S. imports from Rest-of-World. 
 
This third scenario, when compared with the first two, indicates (1) the combined impact 
of an FTA and unilateral liberalization in Mexico, and (2) which of these two changes affect 
agriculture the most in each country.  A comparison with the first scenario gives an indication of 
how the United States would be affected if Mexico were to first give the U.S. sole free access to 
Mexican agricultural markets and then decide to give all countries equal free access.  A 
comparison with the second scenario gives an indication of the impact of putting in place a U.S.-
Mexico FTA after Mexico unilaterally liberalizes – an extreme extension of what is taking place 
recently in Mexico. 
 
The results presented here describe the impact of each of the 3 policy scenarios in a 
typical year after each scenario is fully implemented and the agricultural sectors of the 
participating countries (and the rest of the world) have had several 1988-like years in which to 
adjust. 
 
Each scenario represents an idealized case.  None of the 3 is claimed to represent a likely 














Under 1988 market conditions, model results indicate that a U.S.-Mexican FTA would 
increase bilateral U.S.-Mexico trade of agricultural commodities by more than 15 percent.  
(Note, all trade results are reported in value units, not quantity units – see Table 14.)  U.S. 
agricultural exports to Mexico would increase more than 3 times the increase in Mexican 
agricultural exports to the United States.  One reason is that in 1988, Mexico’s border protection 
was higher than that of the United States. 
 
There would be a small decrease in U.S. agricultural exports to Rest-of-World (ROW), 
due primarily to slightly higher world prices.  The price increases are a result of increased 
imports and domestic consumption by Mexico and the United States. 
 
The ROW experiences only a small increase in net exports (a small decrease in exports 
and a somewhat larger decrease in imports).  That is primarily due to the fact that without the 
FTA, the United States accounts for most of Mexico’s agricultural trade.  Thus there would be 
little opportunity for diverting Mexico’s imports away from the ROW and to the United States 
with an FTA.  Also, the model results show that the ROW’s aggregate exports to the U.S. remain 






Other studies have examined the welfare implications of FTAs.  For a review, see 
Pomfret.  Theoretical models show that the model assumptions can determine whether countries 
and the world are shown to gain and lose welfare from a preferential trade agreement.  Our 
model allows for increasing costs (upward sloping supply functions), substitution in production 
and consumption (cross-price elasticities), and changes in market prices, but it does not include 
increasing returns to scale not other dynamic gains.  The cited theoretical analyses show that 
with these assumptions in our model, one cannot determine ex ante the direction of shift in 






















































 Our model measures welfare as producer and consumer surplus, plus changes in 
government revenues/expenditures.  Results show that U.S. producers and consumers of 
agricultural commodities would face slightly higher prices in aggregate as a result of the FTA.  
Producers also would increase production because of expanded exports to Mexico.  
Consequently, U.S. producers would experience a welfare gain, consumers would experience a 
welfare loss, and the Government would reduce expenditures on various farm programs (Table 
15).




































                                                 
5 Government net expenditures decline because the reduction in domestic support (mainly deficiency payments), due 
to slightly higher farm prices, exceeds the loss of tariff revenue. 
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 Model results show that with an FTA, the prices of agricultural commodities in Mexico 
would fall, in aggregate.  As a result, Mexican consumers and intermediate demanders of feed 
grains would experience a substantial welfare gain and producers would show a loss.
6  The 
Government would experience a net decline in revenue from loss of tariff receipts and quota 
rents.  The net impact is a small welfare gain for Mexico from its agricultural sector. 
 
Because of somewhat higher world prices, the FTA generates welfare gains to producers 
and welfare losses to consumers in the ROW.  The net result is a small net loss in welfare. 
 
The above welfare changes sum up to a small net welfare gain for the world as a whole.  
The largest gain goes to Mexican consumers.  The largest loss comes from consumers in ROW.  
The magnitudes of net gains are very small, as is usually the case with static world trade models.  
To reiterate an earlier point, important potential sources of dynamic welfare gains from reduced 
trade barriers (such as income growth or economies of scale) are assumed away in this model. 
 
 
Implications for Commodity Groups 
 
 
The United States’ main farm exports to Mexico are feed grains, oilseeds, live animals, 
meat, and dairy products.  These exports likely would expand with liberalized trade.  We 
estimate that grains and oilseeds would account for nearly 90 percent of the expansion in U.S. 
agricultural exports (Table 16).  With the increase of exports to Mexico, total U.S. agricultural 
exports to all countries, would increase less than 2 percent. 
 
Mexico’s main exports to the United States are tropical and specialty crops such as 
coffee, fruits, and vegetables, as well as live animals.  Horticultural products would account for 
well over half of Mexico’s expansion of exports to the U.S.  There would also be increases in 








                                                 
6 Welfare changes are not reported for the Mexican cattle sector.  The reason for this omission is that the cattle 
market is segmented, a characteristic which is not adequately captured in our modeling framework.  Essentially, 
feeder cattle located in the northern states are the only tradable segment of the market.  Cattle produced primarily for 
domestic use are considered to be non-tradable. 
   Our model includes all Mexican cattle, creating the impression that the removal of an export tax directly affects 
the entire cattle stock.  Thus, there is a substantial overstatement of the welfare gains to producers and losses to 
consumers.  There also would be an overstatement of the changes in cattle trade but we lowered the supply and 

















































 The FTA examined here implies a small (less than 1 percent) net expansion in U.S. 
agricultural production.  Producers of some commodities such as feed grains would expand 
production.  Producers of some commodities such as certain horticultural products, would 
slightly reduce pollution.  No horticultural product in the model showed a production decline in 
excess of 2 percent. 
 
The expansion of U.S. production of export-oriented commodities would be small 
because agricultural exports to Mexico represent a small proportion of U.S. production.  Corn is 
a good example.  Corn exports to Mexico are estimated to increase about 65 percent due to the 
removal of Mexican border restrictions.  The increase in U.S. corn exports to Mexico is large in 
Mexico’s frame of reference, equivalent to 17 percent of Mexican corn consumption.  But these 
large percentage changes only represents a 3-percent increase in total U.S. corn exports and less 
than a 1 percent increase in production. 
 
The impact of scenario 1 on the trade flows of frozen concentrated orange juice (FCOJ) 
illustrates trade diversion and trade creation. A U.S. import tariff equivalent of 28 percent was 
removed from FCOJ imported from Mexico.  Model results show an increase in U.S. 
consumption of 6 thousand tons and a reduction in U.S. production of 2 thousand tons (about a 
0.25 percent decline) as a result of a slightly lower domestic price.  Imports increased 8 thousand 
tons (1 percent).  Mexico’s exports to the U.S. increased 12 thousand tons (32 percent) but ROW 
(primarily Brazil) decreased exports to the U.S. by 4 thousand tons (0.5 percent).  By removing 
the tariff on FCOJ, the United States created additional trade of 8 thousand tons, and diverted 4 
thousand tons of imports from Brazil to Mexico.  There is almost no trade diversion in any other 
commodity. 
 
The impact of scenario 1 on two-way trade for an individual good is illustrated by live 
cattle.  With the removal of protection (import tariff and export tax), Mexico moderately 
increases its purchases of U.S. slaughter cattle and significantly increases its exports from 
approximately 850 thousand head in the base period to 1050 thousand head.  The Mexican cattle, 
which fall in price by about 10 percent, are moved to the United States for feeding purposes.  
Once fed, some of the cattle return to Mexico for slaughter and some are slaughtered in the 
United States.  The U.S. exports more beef to Mexico, approximately a one-third increase from 





From a U.S. perspective, corn trade dominates the aggregate results presented above.  
Two modifications are made in scenario 1 to see how sensitive the results are to changes in 
assumptions relating to Mexican corn.  First, (scenario 1a) we examine modifications in Mexican 
domestic policy toward corn, other coarse grains, and soybeans as part of an FTA.  We assume 
that Mexican producer (input) subsidies are set equal to U.S. producer subsidies (mainly 
deficiency payments) on a per unit basis.  (The model treats the effects of input subsidies and  
 
 
42 deficiency payments equally.)  This represents a 30 percent reduction of Mexican domestic crop 
support in addition to the removal of the import tariff equivalents.  Results show a 8-percent 
increase in the growth in U.S. exports of grains and oilseeds compared to scenario 1.  Other trade 
adjustments are minor.  The absolute value of all welfare impacts are marginally reduced. 
 
In addition to the assumptions in scenario 1a, we reduced the elasticity of substitution in 
consumption of Mexican corn for U.S. corn from 3 to 1 (scenario 1b).  This reduction assumes 
that Mexican consumers are less willing to substitute yellow corn for white corn in their diet.  
Hence, the increase in demand for U.S. corn by Mexicans, due to an FTA, is diminished and 
there is a smaller price increase of U.S. corn. 
 
Results show that the assumptions of scenario 1b reduce the response of U.S. 
grain/oilseed exports to Mexico, due to the FTA, by over 20 percent relative to results in scenario 
1.  U.S. welfare estimates (shown in table 15 for scenario 1) are reduced by nearly 50 percent as 
the gains to farmers and savings by government are lessened.  However, total welfare changes in 
Mexico are nearly the same as in scenario 1.  These changes in assumptions reduce the price 
responsiveness of Mexico’s demand for U.S. corn.  Thus the trade and welfare responses to an 
FTA in the U.S. and ROW are sensitive to these changes, but Mexican welfare is not. 
 
These two sensitivity experiments show that the aggregate results are moderately 
sensitive to assumptions about corn policy and consumption in Mexico. 
 
One further experiment (scenario 1c) is conducted to provide sensitivity analysis on 
changes in income resulting from an FTA.  The opening of the Mexican economy by reducing 
state-owned enterprises, government regulation of industry, and government intervention in 
commercial policies may encourage investment, employment and economic growth in Mexico.  
Higher growth rates lead to increases in disposable income available to purchase domestic and 
foreign goods. 
 
In our partial equilibrium analysis economic growth is not endogenously modeled.  
However, an exogenous estimate of change in income can be included in the commodity demand 
equations.  Some of the general equilibrium analysis indicate that Mexican and U.S. income 
growth resulting from an FTA would be less than 1 percent (see previous section).  Kehoe 
suggests that these models understate the income effect because they do not consider the rate of 
growth varying endogenously with changes in government policy.  An opening of the Mexican 
economy would promote endogenous technical change due to specialization in product lines and 
increase worker experience.  He claims that Mexico could attain as high as a 25 percent increase 
in output per worker over a 25 year period, approximately 1 percent per year. 
 
Scenario 1 implicitly assumes that there are no changes in income for the U.S. or Mexico.  





43  change in the U.S.  Scenario 1c roughly parallels Kehoe’s hypothesis over an intermediate run.  
All other policy assumptions in scenario 1c correspond to scenario 1. 
 
Our results indicate that with higher income growth, Mexico would become an even 
larger net importer of agricultural products than shown in scenario 1.  With income increasing in 
Mexico there is an expansion in demand for both domestic and foreign agricultural products.  
Mexico has less available for foreign sale and hence, their agricultural exports to all sources 
decline 65 percent relative to scenario 1.  On the import side, Mexican purchases from the United 




Scenario 2: Unilateral Trade Liberalization in Mexico 
 
 
This scenario leads to an expansion of Mexican imports of agricultural commodities of 
the same magnitude as with an FTA – with the U.S. capturing most of that increase (Table 14).  
But Mexican exports increase very little, mainly because U.S. trade barriers do not change in this 
scenario.  The value of world agricultural trade increases somewhat less than with the first 
scenario. 
 
Welfare gainers and losers in the U.S. and Mexico are the same as in the first scenario – 
only more so (Table 15).  U.S. producers enjoy the benefits of expanded exports to Mexico 
without facing lower border protection on imports from Mexico.  Mexican producers are worse 
off than in the first scenario, but consumers are better off.  Consumers benefits from no increase 
in prices of those commodities that Mexico would export with an FTA. 
 
Model results show the United States obtaining most of the world’s net welfare benefits 
from this scenario. 
 
 
Scenario 3:  Mexico Has an FTA with the U.S. and Unilateral 
Trade Liberalization With All Countries 
 
Changes in agricultural trade among the 3 country/regions, caused by the combined 
impact of the two assumed border policy changes, look quite similar to the results obtained from 
the first scenario – an FTA only (Table 14).  ROW, through, increases its agricultural exports 
because of the open access to the Mexican market. 
 
Changes in welfare within and between the 3 country/regions also are quite similar to 
those of the first scenario (Table 15). 
 
A comparison of scenario 3 with scenario 1 indicates that a U.S.-Mexican FTA has a 
relatively large impact on U.S.-Mexican agricultural trade.  However, the additional impact that 
 
44 could be obtained from Mexico removing agricultural trade barriers with all other countries is 
quite small.  The ROW would not be affected much by either policy change in Mexico. 
 
A comparison of this scenario with scenario 2 gives an indication of the impact of a U.S.-
Mexican FTA after Mexico would unilaterally remove border protection with all countries.  As 
expected, the additional impact of the FTA is to remove U.S. border protection and enable 
Mexican exports to the U.S. to expand.  Having this market access to the United States is a 
critical aspect for Mexico.  However, U.S. exports remain virtually the same as in Scenario 2.  
There is a very small net increase in welfare, compared with scenario 2, for the agricultural 





§ The total removal of border protection (scenario 1) provides an upper bound estimate of 
the intermediate-run impact of an FTA on U.S. and Mexican agriculture and agricultural 
trade.  Bilateral trade is estimated to increase by 15 percent.  Relative to the size of the 
two agricultural sectors, however, the overall impact is very small for U.S. agriculture but 
somewhat more significant for adjustment of Mexican agriculture. 
 
§ Unilateral Mexican trade liberalization generates about the same overall magnitude of 
impact on U.S. agriculture as the FTA.  For Mexico, the FTA has the additional benefit of 
access to the U.S. market.  If Mexico were to continue to liberalize its trade prior to 
putting an FTA in place, then the additional economic impact of the FTA would be 
reduced. 
 
§ The size of the overall impact of the FTA also will be affected by to what extent Mexican 
domestic policy modifies its support for consumers and producers of staples such as corn.  
These decisions could have a large impact on the potential U.S. gains in agricultural 
exports, and on adjustments that would need to be made by Mexican farmers. 
 
§ The results are moderately sensitive to the assumed rate of substitution of yellow corn for 
white corn in Mexican consumption, and to the amount of aggregate income growth that 
Mexico might gain from an FTA. 
 
§ Impacts measured here are limited to what could be included in the model.  For example, 
the endogenous effect of an FTA on Mexican income growth, and ultimately on growth 
in demand, is not measured.  And probably even more important, this research says 
nothing about the political impact of an FTA.  An FTA might foster a more stable 
economic environment in Mexico.  These two factors suggest that the impact of an FTA 





 6.  Exchange Rate Policy and the Free Trade Agreement 
 
Exchange rate policy is relevant to the FTA because restrictions on the price and use of 
foreign currency can be used to substitute for tariffs and import quotas.  Thus, an agreement to 
limit the use of tariffs and quotas could be negated by the use of exchange controls.  For 
example, agricultural imports could be restricted by at 10% tariff when there is a single 
peso/dollar exchange rate and Mexicans are free to spend dollars on any import.  Instead of a 
tariff, the Mexican government could restrict convertibility of pesos into dollars and require that 
importers of agricultural products pay a 10% premium for their dollars.  This use of exchange 
controls would circumvent a free trade agreement.  Frequent use of exchange controls by Mexico 
in the past makes the issue more important than it was for the U.S. – Canada agreement. 
 
A second connection between exchange rates and the free trade negotiations involves the 
calculation of tariff equivalents and producer subsidy equivalents.  Some exchange rate is 
necessary to convert world prices into domestic currency prices, and, in the presence of exchange 
controls use of the official exchange rate may produce misleading results. 
 
There are grounds for Mexico’s trading partners to object to the use of exchange controls 
even if importers are eligible for a more favorable exchange rate (fewer pesos per dollar) than 
importers of other products, i.e., agricultural imports are subsidized.  Arbitrary changes in the 
administration of multiple exchange rates could suddenly remove the eligibility of products that 
had been eligible for a favorable exchange rate.  Rationing foreign exchange is an additional 
problem for importers.  If an importer is denied access to foreign exchange at the official rate, he 
may be forced to pay a higher price for foreign exchange in the black market that he would have 
paid under a free float.  The black market exchange rate may be the de facto marginal cost of 
agricultural imports. 
 
Mexico maintained a rigidly fixed exchange rate of 12.5 peros per dollar from 1954-76.  
The peso was devalued in 1976 and again in 1977.  The Mexican foreign debt crisis reached its 
peak in 1982 (Cardoso and Levy).  Dollar amounts in Mexico became payable only in pesos and 
all private banks were nationalized.  The peso was devalued again in 1982 and a two-tier 
exchange rate was implemented.  Mexican inflation reached its peak in 1983 at 102%.  From 
1985-88 there were three exchange rates in existence: a controlled rate, an official “free” rate, 
and a parallel or black market rate.  In 1987, the peso reached its minimum value in the black 
market at 3350 pesos per dollar.  Following the inauguration of President Salinas in 1989, 
Mexico moved toward a unified exchange rate system. 
 
With respect to the free trade agreement, it is important to distinguish between two 
concepts of currency misalignment.  Multiple exchange rates or direct rationing of foreign 
exchange for particular uses can be used to substitute for tariffs and import quotas.  However, 
these policies require restrictions on the quantity of foreign exchange purchased by importers 




46 the presence of exchange controls.  Without exchange controls a single market-clearing 
exchange rate will emerge.  Because of Mexico’s past use of exchange controls, it is reasonable 
to expect its partners in the FTA to request some assurances that exchange controls will not be 
used against them.  Enforcement of an agreement is made easier by the fact that exchange 
controls are easy to detect. 
 
However, the term currency misalignment has also been used in a second sense.  A 
currency may be misaligned if the actual exchange rate differs from a country, whose currency is 
floating freely and whose residents are free to buy any quantity of foreign exchange for any 
purpose may have an overvalued or undervalued exchange rate in this sense.  Many observers 
were convinced that overvaluation of the U.S. dollar from 1980-85 restricted U.S. exports and 
encouraged U.S. imports (Schott, p.7).  A fundamental problem with this notion of misalignment 
is that it depends on a model of exchange rate determination, and there is no professional 
consensus as to which model is best (Meese).  Therefore, the measure of misalignment is not 
unique, and there are no clear of a free trade agreement cannot be asked to avoid misalignment in 
this second sense without agreeing on the appropriate exchange rate model, and selecting the 
appropriate model would be a formidable task for trade negotiators.  Consequently the U.S. – 
Canada free trade agreement contains no provisions on exchange rates.  The task of monitoring 
exchange rates was left to finance officials of the two countries and the International Monetary 
Fund (Schott). 
 
Measuring misalignment in the second sense involves problems in addition to agreeing 
on the appropriate model.  For example, consider the oldest and most popular exchange rate 
model, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).  First, measured misalignment varies with the base year 
chosen.  Second, there is a different PPP measure for each type of price index used.  Third, for a 
multilateral exchange rate index the degree of misalignment varies with the trade-weighting 
scheme used.  The practical significance of these points will be illustrated using Mexican data. 
 
Define the exchange rate (E) as pesos per dollar so that an increase indicates depreciation 
of the peso.  The nominal exchange rate predicted by PPP for a given year is the exchange rate in 
the base year adjusted for relative inflation rates in the home and foreign countries between the 
base year and the current year.  For example, the nominal exchange rate predicted by PPP for 













47 The predicted value for the exchange rate in 1989 (E89) is 2114.5 pesos per dollar and the actual 
rate was 2461.50 pesos per dollar.  An index of the change in the real exchange rate is the ratio 







When this index value is calculated using consumer prices for the bilateral peso/dollar 
exchange rate, its value for 1989 is 1.16, an interpretation is that there has been a 16% real 
depreciation of the peso depreciated 16% more than the Mexican-U.S. price level differential 
during the same period.  A value less than one implies real appreciation of the peso.  A value of 
unity means there has been no change in the real rate, i.e., the nominal rate has followed PPP 
exactly.  A time series for the bilateral rates using consumer prices is shown in column one of 
Table 17. 
 
A possible interpretation of the 1989 value is that the peso was undervalued relative to 
the base year 1962, i.e., the peso should appreciate until the index value returns to unity.  A 
problem with this interpretation is that the conclusion about the value of the peso in 1989 can be 
reversed by choosing 1986 as the base year, or even greater degree of undervaluation can be 














The realized peso/dollar rate of 2461.50 us either 47% too high, 16% too high or 76% of 
the equilibrium value, depending on the base year chosen.  Alternatively the nominal peso/dollar 
rate consistent with PPP is either 3224.8, 2114.5, or 1767.1.  Such a broad range does not 
provide much guidance to policy makers.  In principle, one should choose a base year when the 
exchange rate was in equilibrium, but this is easier said than done.  In general, choosing a base 
year with a large predicted rate (like 1986) produces a smaller IRER for subsequent year (like 
1989) and makes the currency look undervalued in the later year.  The dependence of the PPP 
real rate on the base year is well known, but it has considerable practical importance in the case 
of the peso/dollar rate. 
 
48 A second difficulty with the PPP real rate is that it varies with price indexes and 
weighting schemes.  Price levels can be measured at the consumer or wholesale level and the 
indexes are not perfectly correlated.  In addition, one can calculate a bilateral peso/dollar index 
or a multilateral index of the peso against an average of its main trading partners.  Furthermore, 
the multilateral trade-weighted index can be calculated as an arithmetic mean or as a geometric 
mean.  Six PPP real exchange rate indexes are shown in Table 17.  Columns 1-2 are bilateral 
indexes using consumer and wholesale indexes.  Columns 3-4 are multilateral indexes against 
Mexico’s ten largest trading partners using arithmetic means.  Columns 5-6 are the same as 3-4, 

































Columns (1) and (2) are bilateral with the U.S. dollar.  (1) uses consumer prices and (2) 
uses wholesale prices.  Columns (3)-(6) are multilateral against Mexico’s 10 largest trading 
partners.  Columns (5)-(6) are geometric means using consumer and wholesale prices, 
respectively. 
49 
 All six indexes show the same broad pattern for the peso from 1962-1988.  In most cases 
if an entry is greater than one for a given year, so are the other entries for the same year.  The 
year 1979 is an exception.  In addition, the years 1976, 1981, and 1985 represent local minimum 
values for the RERs for all six measures.  Since these years were followed by large real 
depreciations of the peso, a common interpretation is that these were years of significant 
overvaluation of the peso. 
 
Another general pattern is that prior to 1973 there were no substantial deviations (greater 
than .05) in either direction, regardless of which index is used.  However, beginning in 1973, 
deviations greater than .05 were common for all six indexes.  The extreme years were 1981, 
when five of the six indexes showed overvaluation of at least 20% and 1986-87, when all six 
indexes showed undervaluation of at least 17%. 
 
Beginning in 1973, the indexes showed greater differences among themselves in addition 
to greater deviations from unity.  In 1984, the multilateral consumer arithmetic index was 1.39, 
but the multilateral wholesale geometric index was only .96.  In 1987, the bilateral consumer 
index was 1.52, but the bilateral wholesale index was only 1.26.  This difference occurred in 
1987 although the two indexes had a correlation coefficient of .96 for the entire period, 1962-88.  
(See Table 18.)  In 1988, the bilateral wholesale index was 1.04 and the multilateral wholesale 
index was 1.01, but the multilateral consumer arithmetic index was 1.50.  For these years policy 
makers seeking guidance about the degree of misalignment faced a considerable range of values.  
During the Bretton Woods period when RERs were stable, the choice among alternative RER 
measures was not an important issue.  However, it has become more important during the 























 Thus several measures of equilibrium exchange rate can be calculated using the PPP 
model.  A more fundamental problem with PPP is whether is conforms with real world data.  
Unfortunately, two standard empirical tests using Mexican data produce conflicting results for 
PPP.  (See Fleissig and Grennes.) 
 
A partial adjustment model (see Edwards) was used for Mexico for the period 1962-88.  
An elasticity of the nominal peso/dollar exchange rate with respect to the relative Mexican and 
U.S. price levels was found to be insignificantly different from unity in the long-run.  Thus, PPP 
was consistent with Mexican data in spite of occasional short-run deviations.  An alternative test 
asks whether the Mexican RER follows a random walk as deviations from PPP will not be 
corrected in the long-run.  Using the same bilateral Mexico-U.S. data for the same time period as 
the previous test PPP was strongly rejected.  These contradictory results make it difficult to judge 
the empirical validity of PPP. 
 
Since exchange rate misalignment can be used to substitute for tariffs and quotas, it is 
appropriate to ask members of a free trade agreement to avoid misalignment that requires the use 
of exchange controls.  However, it prudent to exclude from the negotiations the second more 
elusive the misalignment.  The problems of selecting a model, empirically verifying a model, and 
choosing among alternative measures of misalignment for a given model are formidable. 
 
 
7.  Reform of the Mexican Land Tenure System 
 
The current system of land tenure in Mexico directly restricts the ownership of 
agricultural land.  Indirectly the land tenure system influences the use of land, labor, capital, and 
technology in Mexican agriculture depends on whether it is accompanied by reform of the land 
tenure system. 
 
The Mexican countryside represents one of the major challenges and one of the major 
opportunities for Mexican economic development.  At the beginning of this century, Mexico was 
dominated by large haciendas, but now the average size farm is so small that it is difficult for 
individual farmers to earn a living.  The free trade agreement presents an opportunity for reform 
that would increase the productivity of land and workers. 
 
The forces that gave rise to the ejido system are no longer present.  In the 1930s landlords 
were resisting development of a modern state as well as a modern industrial economy.  In 
contrast, a major problem in the countryside today is a land tenure system characterized by small 
inefficient plots of land (minifundio).  In the 1930s land was the abundant factor and labor was 







 The Mexican Revolution of 1910-17 did not give land to landless farmers immediately.  
In 1937, twenty years after the revolution, land reform occurred.  The ejido system, a 
distinctively Mexican institution, emerged.  The ejido was originally planned as a transitory form 
of land tenure.  Over time the rules have become rigid, and the system has become a mechanism 
for permanent state control of the farmers, the ejidatarios. 
 
Members of the revolutionary peasant movement were not fighting for ejidos, but for 
rights to private property that would allow landless people to earn a living.  However, ejidatarios 
today are not able to earn a decent living solely from their ejido activity.  Ejido families earn an 
average only of 40% of the minimum wage.  Given the small size and low quality of ejido land, 
families are not able to work full-time on ejidos. 
 
As even marginal land became unavailable for distribution, the government began to 
distribute land that was not suited for agricultural use.  This policy was a response to rural unrest 
due to lack of employment opportunities.  By law the government must give at least ten hectares 
of irrigated land or its equivalent in rainfed land to each landless peasant. 
 
In order to prevent concentration of land ownership from occurring again, the 
government imposed restrictions on ejidos.  Selling and renting land were prohibited, and 
ejidatarios were forbidden from hiring paid workers.  Conversion of crop land to pasture is 
restricted.  The government is directly involved in the economic and organizational activities of 
the ejidos and it has obtained control over the lives of nearly three million ejidatarios.  Recently 
the ruling political party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) received 81% of its votes from 
rural areas. 
 
The main contradiction of the ejido is that it is simultaneously a production unit and a 
political control system.  As a result, economic rationality is subordinated to political 
expediency.  If the government wants to keep the  ejido as a rural production organization, it is 
necessary to give it greater autonomy.  In order to develop democracy in the ejidos, it is 
necessary to convert them into free agricultural producer associations.  The future of the ejido 
depends on this decision. 
 
More than 75 years after the Mexican revolution, land tenure is worse than it was at the 
beginning of the century.  Although 90 million hectares (almost half of Mexican territory) have 
been distributed to landless peasants, there are still four million landless people, more than at the 
beginning of the Revolution.  Most of the land holdings (70%) are considered subsistence in the 
sense that they cannot generate enough income to support a family. 
 
Ejidos are economically inefficient institutions, and ejidatarios lack the opportunities and 
incentives to change them (Morett Sanchez).  They lack modern technology.  Most ejidos (57%) 
do not have a single tractor.  Ninety percent have no industrial equipment and only 16% of the 




 ejidos, but only 18% of them are involved in forestry activities.  One-third of ejidos lack 
electricity, more than half do not have running water, 80% lack paved roads, and 40% use wood 
as the main fuel source.  Most ejidos do not function as integrated production units but as 
isolated small plots whose usefulness depends on secret and illegal rental arrangements. 
 
Renting and buying land was reported by 60% of the officers of ejidos, but investments 
are inhibited because of the insecurity of claims to land.  Ejidatarios want greater independence 
from government control, and their transformation into efficient economic units depends on it.  
The ejido system needs more flexibility; a small and strong ejido system is better than a large, 
weak one. 
 
Most ejidos are located in the south central region of the country, where 52% of the 
ejidos are concentrated in ten of Mexico’s 32 states.  Ninety seven percent of the arrangements 
are individual ejidos in which every ejidatario is responsible for one plot of land.  In 65% of the 
ejidos corn is the main crop followed by sorghum 7%, beans 5%, sugar 4%, wheat 3% and coffee 
3%.  The main buyers from ejidos are rural middlemen and CONASUPO.  Although federal 
agrarian law prohibits the use of hired workers by ejidos, 64% use hired employees (Morrett 
Sanchez). 
 
Although penalties against renting ejido land are strong (including loss of agrarian 
rights), in the majority of ejidos renting land is a normal practice.  Sharecropping is the rental 
arrangement for 60% of the corn and beans that are produced.  Reasons given for renting vary, 
but they include lack of financial resources (51%), death of a husband, illness, aging (20%), and 
emigration (8%). 
 
In the poor areas land is usually rented to other ejidatarios, but in rich areas it tends to be 
rented to outsiders.  Then land is rented, it is auctioned to the highest bidder at a public meeting 
of ejidatarios.  The land is mostly rented in irrigated areas where, in some cases, the entire ejido 
is rented as in Baja California, Sonora, Sinaloa, Michoacan, and Guerrero. 
 
For watermelon and cantalope production the ejido land is rented by foreigners, mainly 
Americans and Japanese.  In most cases, the ejidatarios rent both their labor and their land, 
which allows them to supervise the use of the land.  In poor areas ejidatarios sometimes offer 
free rent rather than allow the land to go idle, but they may receive no offers. 
 
Widespread evidence of violating rules on renting land and hiring labor indicate that the 
rules are inconsistent with efficient land use.  Circumventing the rules reduces the loss from the 
inefficient land use rules, but it does not eliminate the loss.  Circomvention does imply that the 







 Reform of the ejidos could be accomplished either by modifying the land tenure law or 
by modernizing the organization without modifying the law.  Two solutions that do not seem 
feasible under current conditions are (1) distributing additional land and (2) total privatization of 
land.  Distributing additional land is limited by the quantity and quality of available land in rural 
areas.  Immediate privatization would be hampered by boundary disputes between and within 
ejidos and competing claims on common infrastructure.  Among the more feasible options is 
legalizing land rental either within the ejido or to outsiders.  A second feasible reform, is to 
legalize sale of land on a limited basis.  An individual could sell his plot to the ejido and capture 
the returns from his investment in land improvements.  This option would encourage investment 
and avoid deterioration of the land.  A variation on this idea is to allow sale to other small 
landowners, perhaps those owning no more than twenty hectares. 
 
State control of ejidos could be avoided by granting private ownership to the group rather 
than to individual ejidatarios.  The advantage of economies of scale could be achieved. 
 
A final option is for the government to allow the voluntary decisions of each ejidatario to 
change the ownership pattern to private property rights.  This approach would stimulate 
investment.  Here a possible restriction is that an ejidatario could sell his land no sooner than X 
years after acquiring it.  The transition period to potential private ownership would provide time 
to resolve legal and technical problems related to competing claims.  In November 1991, 
President Salinas proposed major reform of ejidos to the Congress. 
 
The benefits of a free trade agreement would be greater if ejido reform also occurs.  
Reform would allow Mexican agriculture to respond more quickly and more completely to the 
dynamics of international markets.  Without reform, land use cannot be changed from crops to 
pasture.  Without reform, even people cannot move freely because they may lose their claim to 
land if they do not remain near it.  A freer labor market might allow people to earn a living on 
small plots used for commercial crops, such as cut flowers.  Removing impediments to using the 
most efficient combination of land and labor would stimulate investment in Mexican agriculture 
and encourage the use of modern technology. 
 
8.  The Effects of Adding Countries to a Free Trade Agreement 
 
The effect of a bilateral free trade agreement was analyzed in section five.  In general, the 
effect of any preferential trade arrangement depends on whether the lowest cost countries are 
included in the arrangement.  This section analyzes the effect on trade of adding other Western 
Hemisphere countries to the bilateral trading arrangement. 
 
Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has been a major proponent of 






 (GATT).  More recently, the United States also has shown interest in preferential trading 
arrangements (PTAs).  Of the more than 70 PTAs that have been reported to the GATT since 
1947, the United States is a participant in only two.  However, these were initiated during the last 
ten years, and the United States concluded a PTA with Israel in 1985, with Canada in 1989, and 
is currently negotiating with Mexico and Canada for an extended PTA.  The United States also 
launched the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and the Enterprise of the Americas Initiative (EAI), in 
order to eventually create a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Zone.  As part of the EAI, the 
United States will pursue discussions for a PTA with Chile, and has signed a framework treaty 
with MERCOSUR, CARICOM, and other Latin American countries, to strengthen trade and 
investment in the region. 
 
The United States is not the only country interested in developing PTAs.  MERCOSUR, 
the Southern Cone Common Market, was founded in March 1991, by Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay.  In September 1991, Mexico and Chile reached a settlement on a free 
trade pact and both countries are exploring other relationships.  The Andean countries, 
Venezuela, Columbia, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia also have agreed to eliminate tariffs and 
pursue a common price stabilization scheme. 
 
Several issues may arise pending formation of various trade arrangements.  The most 
obvious questions are “who experiences trade increases and who attains welfare gains?”  To try 
to answer these questions, we first need to look at the type of trading arrangements that might be 
formed.  In a recent article by Richard Lipsey entitled, “The Case for Trilateralism,” Lipsey 
outlines three models of PTAs: the hub-and-spoke model, one country, presumably the U.S., has 
separate bilateral free-trade agreements with each of the participating countries (Wonnacot).  For 
example, the United States would have agreements with Canada, Mexico, and Chile.  While the 
“hub”, the United States gains tariff free access to these individual countries (the spokes), the 
“spokes” only gain tariff free access to the United States.  The “spokes” do not realize gains vis-
à-vis other spokes. 
 
In the second model, the overlapping regional free trade area, two countries such as the 
U.S. and Mexico would form a free trade agreement.  Other countries might express interest in 
forming a free trade agreement with Mexico (e.g., Costa Rica and Honduras), while other 
countries might initiate interest with the United States (e.g., Chile and Israel).  A series of 
overlapping agreements could evolve in which the U.S. and Mexico would be included in some 
arrangements, while excluded in others. 
 
In the plurilateral regional model, several countries would establish a regional free trade 
area in which all members received tariff-free access to the markets of all other members.  This 
stands in contrast to the hub-and-spoke model in which only the hub country had tariff free 
access to the markets of all the spokes.  Instead of the United States having separate bilateral 
agreements with Canada and Mexico, these three countries would sign one agreement 
establishing common access to each other’s market – a North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA).  Any other countries interested in joining the regional arrangement would conform 
with the terms of NAFTA.  A country, such as Chile, may want to “sign-up” with NAFTA. 
  
55 The United States, Canada, and other Western Hemisphere countries have expressed the 
most interest in plurilateral regional arrangements.  Nevertheless, participation and the process of 
negotiation seems to be uncertain at the present time.  In this section, we examine the hub-and-
spoke and various plurilateral regional models for a single agricultural commodity, wheat.  We 
choose wheat to serve as an example because it is an important export commodity for three 
Western Hemisphere countries, the United States, Canada, and Argentina, and an important 
import commodity for several other Western Hemisphere countries. 
 
Wheat Trade Flows of Western Hemisphere Countries 
 
Examining the 1987 trading patterns provides a good basis for determining the qualitative 
importance of various preferential trading arrangements.  The data suggest that any type of 
agreement would have small effects on the United States and Canada, but would be more 
significant for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Colombia depending on the type of 
arrangement. 
 
Of the Western Hemisphere countries considered, three are exporters and four are 
importers.  The United States, Canada, and Argentina are major world exporters with shares of 
world wheat trade of 34, 17 and 5 percent, respectively.  In contrast, the importing countries have 
very small shares of the world import market: Brazil has approximately 3 percent, Mexico and 
Colombia 0.5 percent, and Chile a negligible percent.  The importance of these importing 
countries to the three exporters also tend to be small with one exception; 27 percent of 
















From the importer’s perspective the three exporting countries are critical (see Table 20).  
Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia rely on the United States, Canada and Argentina for 
approximately 70 percent of their imports.  Mexico imports mostly from Canada, Brazil imports 




 almost all its wheat from the United States.  Since the bilateral trading patterns are different 
across the exporters and importers, “who is in and who is out of an agreement” could lead to 























In order to quantify the effects of various preferential trading arrangements we 
constructed a wheat model for eight countries using the SWOPSIM – Armington framework.  
The results describe the impact of various regional arrangements for a typical year after each 
scenario is fully implemented and the agricultural sectors of the participating and non-
participating countries have had several 1987-like years in which to adjust. 
 
Five simulation experiments are undertaken to reflect different country participation in 
PTAs (see Figure 9).  In the experiments all import policies are removed for trade with other 
participating countries.  U.S. and Canadian wheat program and Argentine export taxes are 
assumed to continue at the 1987 subsidy (tax) levels.  The quantification of import policies, is 
based on PSE/CSE calculations (Webb et al.) and includes all policy transfers to producers 
through price intervention (e.g. tariffs and import licensing).  Brazil, Mexico, Chile and 
Colombia have import tariff equivalents of 50, 5, 40 and 40 percent, respectively.  Thus, we 
would anticipate that the removal of protection by Brazil would have the largest import effect, 

























Results for each of the following experiments are reported as percent changes from actual 
conditions in 1987 (i.e., changes from the 1987 base solution). In experiment 1 we assume that 
the United States forms an agreement with Mexico.  This is modeled by removing the price 
wedge that represents Mexican import restriction for U.S. wheat.  The elimination of Mexican 
border protection reduces the domestic price in Mexico of U.S. wheat.  U.S. exports to Mexico 
expand 20 percent from 1987 base period (Table 21).  Since Mexico is a small importer of wheat 
the increase in total U.S. wheat exports is negligible (indicated by a 0.1 percent in the column 




















 In experiment 2, the United States, Mexico, and Canada form an agreement and Mexico 
eliminates border protection on wheat imports from the United States and from Canada.  Once 
again, this reduces the Mexican domestic price of wheat providing the incentive to increase 
wheat imports from the United States and also Canada.  U.S. and Canadian wheat exports to 
Mexico expand 18 and 12 percent, respectively (Table 22).  The advantage to Canada in 
participating in the agreement, therefore, is to increase its export share to Mexico.  In this sense a 
plurilateral regional arrangement is preferable to hub-and-spoke (see experiment 4).  However, 
since Mexico is a small importer of wheat, the increase in total U.S. and Canadian wheat exports 
















In experiment 3, we assume separate regional agreements among the United States, 
Mexico and Canada (NAFTA), and Argentina and Brazil (MERCOSUR).  The two importing 
countries, Mexico and Brazil, eliminate border protection vis-à-vis their partners.  These policy 
changes lower the prices of U.S. and Canadian exports to Mexican consumers and the prices of 
Argentine wheat in Brazil.  U.S. and Canadian exports to Mexico increase as before, 18 and 12 
percent, and Argentina expands its exports to Brazil by 193 percent (Table 23).  Since Brazil is 















59 Other countries are effected by MERCOSUR.  In removing their import barriers, Brazil 
increases its demand for Argentine wheat raising Argentine wheat prices.  With the increase in 
price, rest-of-the-world purchases nearly 15 percent less wheat from Argentina and purchases 
marginally more from the United States and Canada.  More importantly, from the perspective of 
the United States and Canada, both countries wheat exports to Brazil decline 23 percent.  Since 
Brazil is a relatively small importer of U.S. wheat and there is an expansion of U.S. wheat 
exports to Mexico, Colombia, and the rest-of-the-world, there is a marginal increase, 0.1 percent, 
in overall U.S. wheat exports.  However, Brazil is a relatively large importer of Canadian wheat; 
the decline in Brazilian imports leads to a marginal decline, 0.3 percent, of total Canadian wheat 
exports despite the increased purchases by Mexico, Colombia, and the rest-of-the-world. 
 
In experiment 4, a hub-and-spoke arrangement is assumed with the United States as the 
hub.  Each of the four wheat importing countries eliminates their restrictive barriers vis-à-vis the 
United States.  Thus, U.S. exports to Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Colombia become comparatively 
less expensive in these four countries and there is an increase in demand for U.S. wheat relative 
to other exporters and domestic producers.  U.S. exports increase significantly: 19 percent to 
Mexico; 292 percent to Brazil; 200 percent to Chile; and 62 percent to Colombia (Table 24).  
While these changes are large percentages they represent only 1.3 percent increase in overall 












The hub-and-spoke experiment adversely affects Canada and Argentina, albeit 
marginally.  Both of these exporters experience a decline of less than 1 percent of their overall 
exports. 
 
In our last experiment, a Western Hemisphere preferential trading arrangement 
(WHPTA) is formed: the NAFTA countries, United States, Canada, Mexico, accept Chile as a 
member country; the expanded NAFTA signs an agreement with MERCOSUR to remove all 
import barriers against all member countries; and Colombia joins the agreement (as a 
representative of the rest of South America). 
 
In WHPTA, the United States expands exports to Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Colombia, 
experiencing a 1 percent rise in overall wheat exports (Table 25).  Brazil accounts for nearly 50 
percent of the increase.  Canada expands exports to Mexico and Brazil attaining nearly a 2 
percent increase in overall exports.  Argentina expands exports to Brazil and Colombia reaching  
 
60 a 28 percent increase in overall exports.  Note, however, that WHPTA relative to MERCOSUR, 
leaves Argentina with a smaller increase in wheat exports.  This is not surprising since the 













Consistent with the hypothesis espoused by Wonnacott, there are differential effects of a 
hub-and-spoke compared to a plurilateral regional agreement.  U.S. export increases are slightly 
less with WHPTA than with a hub-and-spoke since the U.S. loses its exclusivity in a WHPTA.  
As equal participants with the United States in a plurilateral arrangement, Canada marginally 
expands exports while Argentina significantly gains in their trade patterns. 
 
In all five experiments, the domestic markets of the importing countries are affected.  
Regardless of participants in the PTA, importing member countries have less than a 4 percent 
reduction in the production of wheat when import protection is removed (Table 26).  There is 
one exception, Colombia, which has a thin domestic market.  On the consumer side, the removal 
of import barriers raises overall demand in the importing countries.  For Brazil, total demand 
























In this section, we examined the impact of alternative PTAs among Western Hemisphere 
countries on wheat trade patterns.  The wheat market was chosen to illustrate potential trade 
impacts because it is traded by most Western Hemisphere countries. 
 
The United States and Canada are only marginally affected by Western Hemisphere 
preferential trading arrangements.  Depending on country participation in the PTA, total U.S. 
wheat exports expand in the range of 0.1 to 1.3 percent.  Canadian exports could change from –
0.3 to +1.9 percent.  Argentina, on the other hand, could gain much more significantly, as high as 
40 percent.  This reflects the importance of Brazil as an import market for Argentina. 
 
The experiments illustrate how a hub-and-spoke type of PTA would affect trade flows 
relative to the same countries joining a PTA.  The hub-and-spoke expanded exports of the hub 
(U.S.) more than with a plurilateral arrangement.  On the other hand, wheat exporting spokes 
would export less wheat with a hub-and-spoke than with a plurilateral arrangement. 
 
These wheat experiments also show that as countries are added to an existing agreement 
all other members are affected, albeit marginally in some cases.  Some could expand exports at 
the expenses of other members. 
 
The trade results from the simulations should be interpreted cautiously.  They indicate 
what might have happened if a PTA existed in 1987 and if all other exogenous variables 
pertinent to the wheat market remained the same.  Since we only considered one commodity, any 
broad conclusion concerning the benefits of a PTA would be unfounded.  To try to develop a 
fuller understanding of the implications of various PTA arrangements, additional commodities 


















62 9.  Conclusion 
 
 
A free trade agreement would have uneven affects on the three member countries.  
Mexico would be affected most because of its heavy reliance on trade with the U.S. and because 
of its initial higher level of protection.  Canada would be affected least because it already has 
access to the American market and because it trades little with Mexico. 
 
The effects of a trilateral agreement are conditional on the outcome of the more ambitious 
Uruguay Round.  The GATT negotiations are considering liberalizing both border measures and  
domestic policies, whereas the FTA includes primarily border measures. 
 
The effects of unilateral liberalization by Mexico would be nearly as great as the effects 
of trilateral liberalization.  This result is due to the higher initial level of protection in Mexico 
and the assumption that U.S. domestic policies would remain in place following the relaxation of 
border measures. 
 
Nearly all the aggregate trade models show increases in real income for all three 
countries.  The volume of trade among member countries will increase, and trade with non-
members is expected to decrease by a smaller amount. 
 
Most (90 percent) of the increase in U.S. exports to Mexico will be gains and oilseeds.  
More than half of the increase in Mexican exports to the U.S. will be horticultural products. 
 
An agreement to refrain from using exchange controls to restrict trade would be 
consistent with the goals of an FTA, but ambiguity about a broader notion of currency 
misalignment makes it an inappropriate subject for trade negotiation. 
 
Certain features of land tenure laws are symbols of the achievements of the Mexican 
revolution.  However, current restrictions on ejidos reduce agricultural productivity, and reform 
of the laws would increase the benefits of trade liberalization to Mexico. 
 
Trade diversion is unlikely to be a serious problem for the FTA.  A minor case may be 
the importation by the U.S. of frozen orange juice concentrate from Mexico instead of from 
Brazil.  The effect of an expanded FTA on members and non-members will vary from product to 
product.  In the case of wheat, the effect on Argentine exports depends heavily on whether Brazil 











* The views expressed in the paper do not represent the official positions of employers of any of 
the authors. 
 
1.  The Agricultural Cabinet is a committee chaired by the President and including members 
from the Ministry of Agriculture (SARH), Commerce (SECOFI), Finance (SHCP), Planning and 
Budget Office (SPP), Agrarian Reform (SRA), the controller General, and two permanent 
invites, the Directors of CONASUPO and BANRURAL. 
 
2.  We would like to acknowledge Liana Neff and Michelle Freitag for their research assistance.  
We also appreciate the contributions of Vernon Roningen and Peter Liapis. 
 
3.  Canada is omitted from this analysis for two reasons.  First, an additional country greatly 
increases the size of a SWOPSIM – Armington model, and second, Canada’s impact upon the 
results for the United States and Mexico are expected to be quite small. 
 
4.  Estimates of U.S. income support (mostly deficiency payments), input and marketing 
assistance, and miscellaneous items included in PSE/CSE calculations are included as wedges in 
the model.  These wedges are assumed not to change in the scenarios.  Estimates of domestic 
subsidies for Mexico are not included in the model (except for corn in scenarios 1a and 1b and, 
therefore, are assumed implicitly not to change.  The absence of these Mexican policies is due to 
date limitations. 
 
5.  Government net expenditures decline because the reduction in domestic support (mainly 
deficiency payments), due to slightly higher farm prices, exceeds the loss of tariff revenue. 
 
6.  The United States and other industrialized countries agreed to provide preferential treatment 
of imports from developing countries under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).  
These special allowances became GATT legal in 1971 and allowable as long as developing 
countries are treated equally.  However, each industrialized country can determine which 
countries are developing and what special treatment it will offer.  Issues relating to GSP are not 
addressed in this report. 
 
7.  Potential problems with transshipments may occur with the three types of PTAs described.  
Non-member countries may attempt to export their products through a member country with the 
lowest tariff. 
 
8.  The source of our data set is the UN Trade Statistics, which contains data on trade flows for 
the Western Hemisphere countries only through 1987.  Although this data source is generally 
considered not as accurate or as up-to-date as U.S. data sources (FATUS), it is the only single 
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